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I. Executive Summary
Ohio faces significant challenges to its
manufacturing in a global economy.
Energy-intensive manufacturing, in
particular, is threatened by rising
electricity costs and a need to reduce
carbon emissions. Electricity costs are
projected to increase substantially in the
coming years, especially in gridconstrained areas such as that found in
Northern Ohio. Northern Ohio’s Regional
Transmission Organization (RTO)
generation capacity charges are
scheduled to go up by over 1400% in the
next few years, rendering RTO capacity
charges the second highest cost
component to electricity, after the
wholesale cost of electricity. In addition
to this, Ohio manufacturers are incurring
new costs meeting Environmental
Protection Agency guidelines for steam
and heat generation. Together, these
forces have created a significant threat to
Ohio manufacturing.
One answer to this threat is the adoption
of distributed generation, especially in the
form of combined heat and power, or
CHP. Distributed generation is power
generated in small amounts at or near the
site of consumption, thereby reducing line
losses and increasing the strategic value
of that power. CHP offers the best near
term solution for manufacturing, insofar
as it is reliable and it enables the
manufacturer to reduce its reliance on the
grid. CHP can provide a solution to both
the problem of rising capacity charges
and to meeting the EPA requirements for
steam generation. It may also be a
solution for rising distribution charges,
including those associated with the cost
of meeting energy efficiency and
renewable generation mandates.
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However before CHP can be more fully
adopted by manufacturing, regulatory
impediments to its adoption must be
addressed. The two major regulatory
impediments relate to standby charges
and to a lack of a market for surplus
power that values its strategic location
near other markets. If regulators do not
recognize the value CHP can bring to
ratepayers system-wide, standby fees are
likely to render a CHP project
uneconomic. In Ohio, policy makers
sought to enable the adoption for CHP by
passing legislation that qualified CHP as
responsive to the State’s energy efficiency
mandate, but failed to provide a
meaningful mechanism for those
deploying CHP to realize value from this.
Policy makers should look at other
impediments and/or enabling strategies
for the adoption of CHP. Public support
for financing CHP is currently available,
including loans and tax incentives, but
many manufacturers have a difficult time
justifying the long-term investment
required for most CHP projects.
Strategies that mitigate the risk of
stranded assets, such as the use of
modular designs that enable easier
recovery of key assets, might make for
shorter and less risky third party
financing agreements.
Other strategies that policy makers can
deploy to encourage CHP include the
decoupling of sales from utility profits,
the development of self-generation
investment portfolios, regulations that
enable the advent of micro-grids, and
regional energy planning that helps
manufacturers identify opportunities for
district heating and micro-grids.
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Ohio manufacturers face multiple threats
for which distributed generation and CHP
could provide relief. However these
threats also create an opportunity for
manufacturers to position themselves to
have a long-term competitive advantage
over other manufacturers, especially
those in Asia and Europe, who do not
enjoy inexpensive natural gas like Ohio
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does. The advent of shale gas, which has
created a promising long-term outlook for
natural gas prices, may make the case for
CHP even more compelling. However
Ohio policy makers must ensure that
Ohio’s regulations support and do not
impede the deployment of distributed
generation in Ohio, especially for CHP.
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II. Background and Introduction
Manufacturing is an energy-intensive
business. Manufacturers account for
roughly one half of America’s natural gas
and 30% of its electricity consumption.1
Accordingly, a secure, reliable and
affordable source of electricity is a top
priority for Ohio’s manufacturers. Those
manufacturers for which electricity costs
make up an especially significant portion of
their product costs are most vulnerable to
rapid rate increases.2 The decline in
manufacturing jobs throughout America has
accelerated in recent years. Ohio has lost
some 117,000 manufacturing jobs in the
last five years alone – the second highest
total in America.3 Policy affecting energy
costs is critical to Ohio manufacturing
maintaining a competitive position in the
global economy.
Electricity-intensive industries comprise a
major part of Ohio’s manufacturing
landscape. In particular, manufacturers of
chemicals, metal products and glass are
significant employers in Ohio and are
electricity-intensive businesses. Aluminum
manufacturing leads the way, with 5.7% of
its expenditures on electricity. The iron and
steel, chemical, glass and foundry
manufacturing follow, each with a 2.3% or
greater portion of its expenses made on the
1

“Retooling Ohio: A Bulletin for Leaders on Policy
Issues Critical to Ohio Manufacturers,”
www.ohiomfg.com (Ohio Manufacturer’s
Association 2010).
2
Id. at 2-3.
3
S. Thomas, “Long Term Manufacturing Losses
Affect All States,” The Business Journal (July 11,
2012); http://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/onnumbers/scott-thomas/2012/07/longtermmanufacturing-decline-affects.html?page=2.

Center for Economic Development, Cleveland State University

acquisition of electricity. In terms of total
dollars spent, chemical manufacturing leads
the state, with expenditures of over $352
million per year on electricity. Iron and
Steel industries, at $305 million, and
Aluminum at $244 million per year, are
next. These industries all employ many
thousands in Ohio, and are highly sensitive
to increases in electricity costs.4
Manufacturers are also facing multiple
forces that are driving them toward a new
energy paradigm: the shift from centralized
to distributed generation. These forces
include rising electricity costs due to
transmission and generation capacity
constraint, new EPA standards for coal fired
steam and electricity generation, and a
natural gas surplus that has made gas-fired
distributed generation technologies such as
combined heat and power more
economical. This natural gas surplus stands
in stark contrast to the situation in Europe
and Asia, where natural gas prices are
multiples of the cost of gas in America –
promising a potential competitive
advantage for energy intensive
manufacturing in Ohio and elsewhere in
America. Accordingly, manufacturers are
now looking more closely than ever at
distributed generation.
This study is intended to provide
manufacturers with insights as to policies
that may affect their ability to deploy
distributed generation to reduce their cost
4

I. Lendel, et al, “Moving Ohio Manufacturing
Forward: Competitive Electricity Pricing,” the Urban
Center, Levin College, Cleveland State University
(February 2013).
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of electricity, and to provide ideas or
strategies for manufacturers to consider for
deploying distributed generation. In
addition, this study is intended to help
inform policy makers as they consider what
can and should be done in Ohio to
encourage distributed generation. A
separate and companion study also includes
an analysis of how changes in electricity
pricing can affect manufacturing
productivity.5

5

Id.
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A. The Role of Deregulation in Electricity Pricing.
Not surprisingly, given the above statistics,
it has been energy intensive manufacturers
in Ohio and elsewhere that have
championed electricity policy reform in
America over the past thirty years.
Manufacturing has been successful in this
endeavor – leading to what one energy
writer called the “Quiet Revolution”:
governments around the world are
liberalizing their energy markets, opening
up their borders to energy markets for
natural gas and electricity.6 This
“revolution” was originally instigated by
energy-intensive industries seeking to open
up electricity and natural gas markets in
America. The industries were motivated in
part by the energy shocks of the 1970’s and
the resulting legislation: the National Gas
Policy Act (NGPA) and the Public Utilities
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA).7 Both acts
were passed to deal with the energy crisis
that had gripped the nation and had
catalyzed the onset of the “rust belt” in the
Great Lakes region. The NGPA froze “old”
gas sold on the interstate market at
unsustainable prices, but rewarded
producing companies who drilled for new
natural gas production with market prices,
thereby eventually alleviating the natural
gas crisis. PURPA, however, was less
successful in resolving electricity problems.
Its goal was resolve electricity shortfalls by
encouraging conservation and mandating
that utilities purchase power from
independent wholesale power producers.
6

V. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People: How the
Coming Energy Revolution Will Transform an
Industry, Change Our Lives and Maybe Save the
Planet, at 18 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2003).
7
Public Utilities Regulatory Act, Pub.L. No. 95-617,
92 Stat. 3117 (1978); Natural Gas Policy Act, Pub.L.
No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978).
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However the existing regulatory framework
caused electricity prices to continue to rise
even as new generation was brought on
line.
Under PURPA the individual states were to
encourage new generation from small
(below 80 MW) facilities that used
something other than fossil fuels, or used
waste heat, by requiring utilities to
purchase power there from at its “avoided
cost” – the cost the utility would have had
to pay if it had built new, centralized
electricity generation of a like amount. But
avoided costs were not based on market
prices; there was no wholesale market for
electricity at the time. Instead, prices were
based upon “but for” forecasts, and
regulators soon found that electricity prices
had no relation to market realities.
Independent power producers had no
incentive to innovate or to provide
electricity at a lower cost.8
For decades in America, electricity
generation, transmission and distribution
were all regulated, with utilities enjoying
“cost plus” rate recovery for nearly all of
their expenditures, regardless of their folly.
The cost-plus strategy invited not only
technology stagnation, but also bloated
utility budgets, since there was no incentive
to constrain costs. Inevitably, rates soared
under this paradigm; average electricity
rates in America rose 60% between 1969
and 1984, adjusted for inflation.9 The
biggest culprit for this problem lay with
massive cost overruns associated with the
8

J. Lesser and L. Giacchino, Fundamentals of Energy
Regulation, 9-11 (Public Utilities Reports 2007).
9
Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 31.
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building of large centralized nuclear
generation plants.
By the 1990’s a wholesale electricity market
was beginning to develop (partly in
response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992).
Further, due to a sluggish economy,
demand for electricity was stagnant, and a
surplus capacity developed. Yet power
costs remained high due to the massive cost
overruns and the cost-plus regulatory
recovery schemes. Residential and
commercial end users, with little voice for
advocacy at the time, could do little about
this. Energy intensive industrial users, on
the other hand, had the wherewithal to
influence energy policy in the United States.
As a result, manufacturers, along with other
large users of power, began to coordinate
efforts to lobby for the right to bypass
utilities and to take their loads to an open
wholesale generation market. As a result,
in 1994 deregulation was first introduced to
America through sweeping regulatory
reform in California.10 Deregulation
thereafter spread throughout the nation,
and continues to develop to this day.
California, predictably, also was the source
of the first major problems with
deregulation. First out of the gate,
California took some serious missteps, the
most problematic being that it only partially
opened up its electricity markets.
California’s public service administrators
froze retail electric rates -- at a time when
power generation there was already in a
tight market -- thereby creating no
incentive for consumers to cut back usage.
Then, in the face of this tight power supply,
California officials adopted what has since
been described as the “BANANAS” (Build
10

Lesser, Fundamentals of Energy Regulation, at 10.
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Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near
Anybody) strategy: a combination of
uncertainty, tough environmental laws and
politics discouraged new generation from
being built. On top of this, wholesalers like
Enron found ways to rig the markets. The
result was that wholesale prices shot up,
retail prices remained frozen, and utilities
fell into financial disarray, with two utilities
pushed to the point of insolvency.11 A
backlash to deregulation began to occur in
that state, led by the long, hot summer of
2000 when electricity prices skyrocketed
and blackouts became commonplace.
None of the promised cost reductions had
materialized. By 2001 calls for “reregulation” began to be heard.
In 1999, before the California problems
emerged, Ohio took its first steps towards
deregulation with the enactment of Senate
Bill 3 in 1999. At the time, electricity prices
varied dramatically between northern and
southern Ohio; southern Ohio enjoyed coal
generation and lower rates, while northern
Ohio used a mixture of coal and the more
expensive nuclear power.12 The result was
that manufacturers and consumer groups
lobbied the Ohio legislature to open up the
state’s electricity markets. Ultimately,
however, a competitive market for
electricity failed to fully materialize. Many
argued that too many concessions to the
utilities had discouraged, rather than
encouraged, competition. The result was
the 2008 partial “re-regulation” of the

11

Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 74-82.
See e.g. D. Gearino, Former PUCO Officials and
Legislatures Say State Regulatory Process Favors
Utilities Over Customers in Setting Rates, The
Columbus Dispatch, Dec. 18, 2011, at 1A.
12
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electricity industry through Senate Bill
221.13
It remains to be seen how successful
deregulation will be in creating an open
market for wholesale electricity in Ohio and
elsewhere. Wholesale electricity prices
have dropped significantly since 2008, but
this appears to be more related to the deep
recession than to a more robust wholesale
market. Further, the evidence of the effects
of deregulation has been obscured by the
fact that only those states where electricity
prices were high chose to deregulate. So
while it may appear that electricity price
increases have slowed in the deregulated
states as a result of deregulation, the fact
remains that those states that restructured
their markets continue to have electricity
prices that are substantially higher than
those who did not – and that gap has
actually grown, not gotten smaller, since
deregulation began in the late 1990’s.14
One significant reason why deregulation
has failed to fully develop a fully
unencumbered wholesale market is that
this markets remains captured by regional
transmission organization (“RTO”) capacity
charges. “Capacity” in this sense refers to
the amount of electricity locally available to
be delivered when demand on the grid is at
its peak – typically in late afternoons in high
summer. Because transmission is tied so
closely to generation, generation does not
enjoy a completely free market. High RTO
capacity charges commonly result when
constrained transmission combines with
13

Id.
Retail Electric Rates in Deregulated and
Regulated States: 2011 Update, American Public
Power Association, April 2012,
http://publicpower.org/files/PDFs/RKW_Final__2011_update.pdf
14
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insufficient local generation. Since this
power supply is essentially on standby,
awaiting peak system wide requirements, it
tends to use the most expensive – and most
profitable – energy generation technology.
Nowhere is the problem of capacity costs
more evident than in Northern Ohio’s First
Energy-Ohio region, known as “American
Transmissions Systems, Inc., or ATSI.” In
May 2012 First Energy’s RTO, PJM, held a
capacity auction that resulted in RTO
capacity costs for the ATSI region that were
three times higher than the rest of the PJM
territory. While the resulting costs
consumers bear will depend upon the
coincidence of their peak demand with
system wide peak demand, the average
capacity costs in northern Ohio will increase
by 1700% by 2015 – ultimately becoming
the second largest component of electricity
prices for most customers, and for some,
the highest.15
In theory, high capacity charges should lead
to the building of new generation. But
there is not always a direct relationship
between short-term price signals and the
building out of long-term capacity.16 Under
Ohio regulations, for instance, the utilities
will prefer to build new grid in response to
grid congestion rather than to build new
generation capacity, since a return is
guaranteed on the grid investment, but not
M. Brakey, “Skyrocketing First Energy-Ohio
Capacity Costs,” at 1 (September 2012). See
http://www.brakeyenergy.com/white-papersspecial-reports/
16 See e.g. R. Michaels, “MW Gamble: The Missing
Market for Capacity,” The Electricity Journal, at 5664 (December 1997) (“Reluctance to commit to
generation in anticipation of markets may indicate
that we have not thought through the
consequences of the institutions we are putting in
place.)
15
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the generation. Indeed, it has been shown
in Europe, where generation has also been
deregulated, that short term price signals
sent by high capacity charges do exactly the
opposite: they induce utilities to under
invest in aggregate capacity, and to
profitably distort the technology mix
towards peaking units.17 It may prove more
profitable in Ohio for utilities to maintain
capacity constraint and to continue to tack
large peaking unit capacity charges onto
wholesale power prices. In short, utilities
strategically limit their investment into local
generation to maintain higher prices.18
Other problems with deregulation, such as
incomplete open access to transmission
lines, remain to be resolved. However the
biggest current threat to deregulation, and
to Ohio manufacturers, is the capacity
charge problem. All of this is outside the
scope of the Public Utility Commission of
Ohio (PUCO) to control. That said,
however, the threat of rising capacity
charges can be mitigated in principal part
through self-generation. This will require a
regulatory scheme in Ohio that is friendly to
distributed generation.

See G. Meunier, “Capacity Choice, Technology
Mix and Market Power,” 32 Energy Economics, at
1306-1315 (April 2010).
18 Id. at 1307.
17
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B. Distributed Generation: the Next Energy Revolution
While deregulation problems continue to
be worked out, industrial manufacturers are
left to consider how to constrain costs on
the regulated side. This will inevitably lead
to the next “quiet revolution” to our
national energy paradigm: the shift from
centralized to distributed electricity
generation (DG). The best way to constrain
grid costs, as well as RTO generation
capacity charges, is to substantially reduce
reliance upon the grid. DG is the best
available strategy to accomplish this.
It has long been thought that energy
intensive industries like steel, glass and
chemical manufacturing could be “ground
zero” for rethinking how energy is
generated and used in America. These
industries consume large amounts of fossil
fuels and electricity to melt scrap iron, iron
ore, and sand, and to produce chemicals.
Recycling the waste heat from these
industries could itself generate some 5% of
America’s electricity needs.19 Likewise, in
Gotherburg, Sweden two refineries use
waste heat to provide nearly half the
450,000 residents of that town with district
heating. None of the 150 refineries in
America, including the several that operate
in Ohio, recycle waste heat for use in
residential heating.20
Ohio is uniquely placed to play a leading
role in the advent of distributed generation.
That is because the many locations where
DG is likely to first become economical are
those involving generation at industrial
sites, and Ohio is among the nation’s
19
20

Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at 32.
Id.
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leaders in generation capacity from
industrial waste heat. According to the
Environmental Protection Agency, Ohio has
enough waste heat to generate the
equivalent power of 8 nuclear power plants,
leading some observers to characterize
Ohio as the “Saudi Arabia of
cogeneration.”21 The Oak Ridge National
Laboratory projects that waste heat
recovery systems can be available for
around $1500/kW installed22 – a price that
should be attractive for electricity intensive
manufacturing. The potential to avoid
future carbon taxes and to create jobs also
makes this of considerable interest to
Ohio’s policy makers.23
Two other factors will likely lead to the
advent of distributed generation in Ohio.
The first is the April 2012 adoption of new
federal EPA Clean Air Act pollution
standards (the so-called “Boiler MACT”
regulations)24 that will cause area-wide
21

L. Marginelli, “The Case for Gray Power,” The
Nation, February 15, 2010
(http://www.thenation.com/article/case-graypower).
22
Id.
23
According to Policy Matters, Ohio, as many as
20,000 jobs could be created from cogeneration, and
the release into the atmosphere of 13 metric tons of
carbon could be avoided. See “Capturing Waste
Energy In Ohio: Using Combined Heat and Power to
Our Electric System,” Policy Matters Ohio (March
2012)
(http://www.policymattersohio.org/combined-heatpower-march2012).
24
See
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/comustion/docs/201
11202overviews.pdf. The Ohio Public Utilities
Commission resolved in February 2012 to develop an
educational forum to begin a pilot program designed

Page 10

capital investment into new, cleaner steam
generation capacity. Many Ohio industries
have large, old coal boilers producing large
volumes (over 100,000 lbs/hr) of steam.
These boilers tend to work continuously,
are inefficient, and require as fuel low sulfur
“compliance coal.”25 Industrial users that
are considering an upgrade of their coal
boilers in order to comply with the new
rules may find this to be a convenient time
to convert to more efficient heat creating
systems, such as combined heat and power
(CHP). With these systems, electricity made
as a byproduct of generating heat can be
converted for use on site, thereby
dramatically improving systemic efficiency.
The second factor relates to grid
congestion, especially in Northern Ohio. It
has been recognized for some time that the
traditional American energy model -- large
centralized generation plants with a robust
grid system with a nearly ubiquitous reach –
is no longer the best model for future
planning. Northern Ohio, in particular, has
been grid constrained for a number of
years. As a result, and in anticipation of
retiring old coal burning generation
facilities, First Energy now plans to
undertake a $1 billion transmission
upgrade.26 Some experts have questioned

to develop and share information about combined
heat and power as a strategy for compliance with
the new Boiler MACT rules.
25
S. Casten “EPA’s Boiler MACT Is an Economic
Growth Opportunity,” (June 15, 2012)
http://grist.org/article/epas-boiler-mact-is-aneconomic-growth-opportunity/. Compliance coals
run around $90/ton, or $3.60/mmbtu. If a boiler is
75% efficient, this means that the cost of delivered
steam would be $4.80/mmbtu. Id.
26
J. Funk, “First Energy Will Spend $1 Billion on High
Voltage Transmission Lines and Substations,”
Cleveland Plain Dealer (May 18, 2012);
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the wisdom of such an investment when
distributed generation has become
increasingly cost effective, and passing
these transmission costs through to
manufacturers will inevitably lead to
product price increases and possibly
compromise competitiveness.27
In the meantime, as set forth earlier, RTO
capacity charges are on the rise. PJM
anticipates that there will be changes in the
next several years to Ohio’s generation fleet
on an “unprecedented scale.”28 PJM
announced in May 2012 that it had
purchased as power supplies in its auction
for 2015-16 a “record amount of new
generation.” Northern Ohio suffered the
highest prices in the PJM market -- $357 per
Megawatt, more than twice the PJM base
price of $136 per Megawatt.29
In addition to rising transmission and
capacity charges, Ohio manufacturing faces
an additional threat that could be resolved,
in part, by switching to distributed
generation: carbon regulation. Driven in
part by EPA requirements to either clean up
or shut down old coal plants and in part by
a depressed natural gas market, much of
coal electricity generation will be replaced
by natural gas in the coming years.
According to one recent study, even
http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012
/05/firstenergy_will_spend_1_billi.html.
27
See e.g. L. Traves, “Another Bad Energy Policy for
Ohio,” Crain’s Cleveland Business (May 29, 2012),
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20120529/
BLOGS05/120529844/1241/newsletter04.
28
PJM News Release, “PJM Capacity Auction Secures
Record Amounts of New Generation, Demand
Response and Energy Efficiency” (May 18, 2012);
http://pjm.com/aboutpjm/newsroom/announcements-and-newsreleases.aspx.
29
Id. at 2.
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accounting for a marginal increase in life
cycle greenhouse gases generated through
hydraulic fracturing, burning natural gas
emits less than half the carbon that burning
coal does.30 This reduction in carbon
emissions will likely become a critical
economic element to the viability of Ohio
manufacturing in the coming years, as
increasing restrictions are placed on carbon
emissions.

30

N. Hultman, et al, “The Greenhouse Impact of
Unconventional Gas for Electricity Generation,”
Environmental Research Letters (IOP Science
October 2011)(Online at:
stacks.iop.org/ERL/6/044008).
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III. Distributed Generation in Manufacturing
Distributed generation (DG) has become
increasingly the focus of energy policy
research. DG promises not only improved
energy efficiency, but also improved
environmental quality and lower costs.
However capturing the full range of
advantages offered by a DG system
depends upon the circumstances of each
location. It may depend, for instance, upon
the integration of energy management
systems and complementary technologies
such as control systems or uninterruptible
power supplies.31
However the benefits do not inure solely to
the industrial users. Utilities, too, can and
should benefit from DG systems. Besides
the development of ancillary generation
services from this industry, utilities also
benefit from avoided transmission and
distribution improvements, more
predictable demand profiles and improved
asset utilization.32 As noted by energy
pundit Amory Lovins of the Rocky Mountain
Institute, the old model of centralized
generation with a ubiquitous grid was based
upon the 20th century idea that generation
was less reliable than the grid. But the 21st
century reality turns this model on its head
– today, generation, especially gas turbine,
is more reliable than the grid. Accordingly,
one of the fundamental reasons for
centralized generation no longer exists.33
31

D. King, “The Regulatory Environment for
Interconnected Electric Power Micro-grids: Insights
from State Regulatory Officials,” Carnegie Mellon
Electricity Industry Center Working Paper CEIC-05-08
(2008).
32
Id. at 2.
33
A. Lovins, E. Datta, T. Feiler, K. Rabago, J. Swisher,
A. Lehmann, and K.Wicker, Small is Profitable: The
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As Lovins notes, today “the cheapest, most
reliable power” is that which is “produced
at or near the customers.”34
Ohio policy makers have recognized the
value of DG, and have enacted regulatory
reform designed to encourage its
deployment. In 2008 Ohio Senate Bill 221
revised current rules for the adoption of DG
such that manufacturing companies need
no longer own the DG facilities, but need
only “host” facilities owned by others. This
enabled manufacturers to have third parties
own and operate the generation facility,
potentially avoiding not only an up front
capital outlay, but also having to operate a
facility which may be beyond the scope of
their expertise. Second, SB 221 enabled
net metering for certain forms of DG,
specifically wind, solar and biomass
generation, such that the full value of
electricity delivered at that site could be
realized. Net metering for these specific
forms of generation is such that the meter
runs backwards when production is greater
than that used on site. Senate Bill 315,
enacted in May 2012, added waste heat
recovery systems to this category of
electricity generation.35 Third, Senate Bills
Hidden Economic Benefits of Making Electrical
Resources the Right Size at 2, Rocky Mountain
Institute: Snowmass, Colorado (2002);
http://www.rmi.org/KnowledgeCenter/Library/U01-13_SmallIsProfitable.
34
A. Lovins, Small is Profitable at 2.
35
Since waste heat recovery systems can be quite
large, this may prove controversial. The Public
Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) had previously
ruled that SB 221 had an implied limitation to the
size of the system qualifying as a renewable
because, by statute, a net-metered system must be
intended to offset part or all of the customer-
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221 and 315 also provide for Renewable
Energy Credits for generation of renewable
energy, including Waste Heat Recovery.
Combined heat and power, however, has
no similar program in place. CHP systems
can be operated behind the meter in Ohio,
but otherwise SB 221, as originally crafted,
offered little more help.36 Utilities do not
have to pay the value of electricity
delivered when taking power back onto the
grid. Instead, they pay what they consider
to be the value of displaced power,
calculated at the cost of generation at some
distant centralized point. The actual
electrons may be delivered to a
manufacturer down the road 100 yards, but
the utility is not required to compensate for
the strategic location of the power
generation.37

generator's electricity requirements. However
waste heat recovery systems found in industrial
settings may offset a large load. The result is that
the classification of waste heat recovery systems as
renewable under SB 221 may impact the rate of
adoption of other renewable systems, such as wind
or biomass.
36
As set forth in Section III(A), infra, Senate Bill 315
did provide new incentives for CHP by modifying SB
221 to allow large energy users to potentially obtain
a waiver on a rider that is designed to enable utilities
to recover costs incurred in meeting the energy
efficiency programs set forth in SB 221.
37
Ohio’s original net-metering law was enacted in
1999 as part of the state’s electric-industry
restructuring legislation. The Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio (PUCO) later revised its net
metering rules in March 2007, prompted by the
federal Energy Policy Act of 2005. Initially, PUCO
required utilities to credit customer net excess
generation at the utility's full retail rate. However, in
June 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that each
utility must credit excess generation to the customer
at the utility's unbundled generation rate. See:
http://energy.gov/savings/ohio-net-metering.
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This policy, along with the general policy of
guaranteeing a “cost plus” recovery on
expenditures on the still-regulated grid, has
led to the traditional utilities being
incentivized to allocate as much of their
costs as possible to the grid, and as little as
possible to generation. Not surprisingly, we
see as a result widely disparate estimates
for the cost of power production from
centralized generation. Utility accounting
under this system, which may not include
such things as the anticipated cost of
decommissioning a nuclear power plant,
typically sets a low generation cost for
nuclear power. Yet the cost for nuclear
energy generation, by most measurements,
is very high.38

38

See e.g. Vaitheeswaran, Power to the People, at
274-290. This policy of allocating costs when
possible to the grid rather than to generation, in
addition to ensuring the cost-plus return, also
ensures that the existing utility generation is highly
competitive in the wholesale market.
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A. Limited Sales Options for Net Excess Generation Discourage SelfGeneration
Unless the on site generation falls under the
Senate Bill 221 or 315 definition of a
“renewable energy,” excess generation
must be sold back into the grid at the
unbundled “generation rate” for power.
Under such circumstances, the return for
generation is significantly diminished: there
is no value attributed to the strategic
location of the generation near a market. If
the generation is sufficiently big (above 138
kV), there will likely be an available
interstate market, although there will also
likely be a queue of companies looking to
sell such power therein.39 Even when such
sales are available, however, there will still
be no allocation of value for the strategic
location of the generation. The result is
that excess power placed into the grid is
likely to get off-peak, wholesale prices for
such electricity.

even recover the going rate for unbundled
wholesale generation.

For systems generating power below 138
kV, however, no interstate market is
available. Utilities are required to purchase
the power if the generation is from a
qualified facility, but only at the displaced
generation price (i.e. the “avoided cost of
generation”). In Ohio, the avoided cost has
been set as low as $0.012/kw-hr.40
Accordingly, smaller systems will likely not

39

K. Wissman, “CHP and PUCO” Public Utilities
Commission of Ohio Workshop on CHP (March
2012). See:
http://www.puco.ohio.gov/puco/index.cfm/industry
-information/industry-topics/combined-heat-andpower-in-ohio/. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission would regulate an interstate sale of
power by a distributed generator into the wholesale
market.
40
Id.
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B. Excessive Standby Rates Threaten Combined Heat and Power Generation
Manufacturers that operate or host
distributed generation on their property
commonly need to have back up power
available for those times when the DG is not
generating electricity. The Federal Public
Utility Regulatory Act (PURPA) requires
utilities to provide standby service to its
customers who develop “qualified”
distributed generation facilities. Rates,
terms and conditions for standby power are
typically set by the state utility regulatory
commission.41
Utilities use two sorts of contracts to sell
power to large-scale power users. The first
is the “Full Requirements Contract,”
pursuant to which the customer agrees to
purchase his entire electrical load from the
provider. Under these contracts, there are
two principal costs: (1) the Energy Charge,
which is the charge for actual consumption
of kW-hrs), and (2) the Demand Charge
(sometimes also called a “Capacity
Charge,”)42 which is a charge for the

41

18 CFR Section 292.303(b) (“obligation to sell to
qualifying facilities.”)
42
Demand charges are used to recover the capital
costs of maintaining the capacity necessary to meet
the customer’s peak load requirements, but also the
system as a whole. Residential and small
commercial contracts oftentimes do not separate
Demand and Energy charges, but instead roll them
into one charge. See R. Weston, et al, “Standby
Rates for Customer-Sited Resources,” U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of
Atmospheric Programs, at 3 (December 2009);
www.epa.gov/chp/documents/standby_rates.pdf.
Unfortunately, the electricity industry does not
always have uniform terminology for its different
charges, and this creates considerable confusion for
those who are trying to understand billing protocols.
See e.g.
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incurred cost of maintaining a sufficient
peak demand delivery capability. The
latter charge is priced on a per kW basis,
and is based on a peak demand interval of
between 15 to 30 minutes during a given
period, commonly one month.43
The second type of power purchasing
contract is for those customers who
generate a portion of their own electricity
on site. These “Partial Requirements
Contracts” include provisions that address
the need for not only supplying the normal
shortfall between requirements and on site
generation (“supplemental power”), but
also supplying back up power during
periods of scheduled or unscheduled
outages. These sorts of contracts have four
categories of charge: (1) supplemental
service, charged on a kW-hr basis for actual
power used under a rate schedule; (2)
scheduled back up service, for those times
when maintenance is scheduled (usually
during non-peak hours); (3) unscheduled
back up service, for when the customer’s
system goes off line unexpectedly, and
usually immediately; and (4) Capacity
Charge, which is a per kW cost for capacity
reserved to be delivered in the event that
the customer has to be served for any

http://www.teachmefinance.com/Scientific_Terms/
Capacity_charge.html.
43
G. Miller, C. Haefke and J. Cuttica, “Iowa On-Site
Generation Tariff Barrier Overview,” at 7,
Environmental Law & Policy Center (April 2012).
Miller, et al, also refers to “capacity” charges as
“reservation” charges. There are also other smaller
charges, such as a fixed “Customer Charge” for
administration costs, and for taxes.
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length of time at the maximum load
possible.44
A more recent study characterizes these
four groups as “supplementary, backup,
maintenance and interruptible power” – all
of which can be grouped together in a
single “standby tariff.” 45 For purposes of
determining a standby rate, the author
considers three charges: (1) fixed charges,
(2) volumetric charges and (3) demand
charges. Fixed charges are intended to
cover infrastructure supply and delivery
costs, regardless of the customer’s actual
monthly requirements. Volumetric charges
are set by the actual energy consumed, and
can be metered. The demand charges are
set by the maximum power used during a
specified time period, and are intended to
compensate the utility for the fixed costs of
infrastructure shared with other customers,
in proportion to the capacity each
requires.46

upon a “ratchet” device. Ratchets
commonly set demand/capacity charges at
the highest priced power used in any
interval within a given period of time (for
example, a year) – with the interval
oftentimes as small as fifteen minutes.
At the outset, it should be noted that the
public policy case for the assessment of any
standby fee is by no means clear. Utilities
justify them by arguing that (1) they are
necessary to recover the costs associated
with providing the ability to generate and
deliver peak power in the event of an
outage, and (2) they prevent crosssubsidization of DG customers by non-DG
customers.47 Further, utilities argue,
customers with DG systems have no
obligation to generate power; if a customer
decides to discontinue DG operations, the
utility could, in theory, be required to serve
that full load on an ongoing basis.

It is within this fee that many argue utilities
overcharge. This is especially so for those
where demand/capacity charges are based

Proponents of DG argue that these
arguments are self-serving. First, standby
does not create a material cost for the
utilities. Only the last several hundred feet
of wire is typically unique to the end user –
the vast majority of the grid is spread
among multiple users. Moreover, it is
highly unlikely that all DG would
malfunction at a “coincident peak time.” In
short, having all customers paying for
maximum back up peak power assumes
that all customers will have a simultaneous,
unplanned DG outage – a scenario that
defies logic. Second, non-DG users will
actually benefit from DG; therefore, no
cross-subsidization exists. Any measures

44

47

Simplicity and transparency in standby rate
design is apparently not so easy to
accomplish. Disaggregating and
determining the cost components of a
standby rate can make for a complex and
confusing rate structure. Any of these
charges can bear portions of what amounts
to a “standby charge.” However it appears
to be the demand/capacity (depending
upon the nomenclature) charge that creates
the most controversy.

Id. at 7-8.
T. Stanton, “Electric Utility Standby Rates: Updates
for Today and Tomorrow” at 2, National Regulatory
Research Institute (July 2012).
46
Id. at 8-9.
45
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S. Casten, “Are Standby Rates Ever Justified? The
Case Against Electric Utility Standby Charges as a
Response to On-Site Generation,” at 58, The
Electricity Journal, 1040-6190/03 (Elsevier Science
Inc. May 2003).
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that reduce the need for repair or
construction of distribution and
transmission assets inures to the benefit of
all users, not just the DG end users.48 At
an average cost for grid development of
approximately $1300-1400/kW49 -- a cost
close to that of installing CHP – it is easy to
see how ratepayers as a whole benefit from
DG. If, for instance, some or all of the
planned $1 billion First Energy investment
into upgrading the grid could be avoided by
ramping up DG, this avoided cost would be
shared by all of its customers. Indeed,
according to one expert, the only crosssubsidization going on with the build out of
DG under current regulations is by the
ratepayers to the utilities.50
Nevertheless, regulatory bodies are inclined
to accept the utility arguments for the need
for standby fees. The problem, then, is to
determine what charges are reasonable
under the circumstances – and what
charges can be borne by distributed
generators without rendering the project
unviable. The Environmental Protection
Agency has determined that unless the
customer, by installing CHP, can avoid at
least 90% of its otherwise applicable rate
costs, CHP will not be viable.51
Unfortunately, this number is one that is
not commonly met with existing standby
charges in most jurisdictions. In a study by
48

Casten, supra at 60-61. See also Miller, supra, at

8.
49

Casten, supra at 61.
Id. at 62. For a counter perspective, see J.
Morrison, “Why We Need Standby Rates for On-Site
Generation,” The Electricity Journal, at 74-80, 10406190 (Elsevier Science Inc. October 2003).
51
Weston, et al, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Office of Atmospheric Programs, Climate
Protection Partnerships Division, “Standby Rates for
Customer-Sited Resources (Washington D.C. 2009).
50
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the Midwest Clean Energy Application
Center, avoided cost percentages from
utilities in Iowa, for instance, ranged from a
low of 74% to a high of 81% among Iowa
investor owned utilities.52
Avoided cost, in this context, is that of a
kW-hour not purchased from a utility due to
on-site generation. The closer the avoided
cost comes to matching the price that
would have been otherwise paid under a
full requirements contract, the more the
customer maximizes his savings with the
CHP project. These conditions are most
likely met, according to the EPA, when (1)
demand charges are small in relation to the
energy costs; (2) demand charges are not
ratcheted, or if they are, the window for
determining the ratchet is reasonable; and
(3) the supplemental contract prices for
actual energy consumed are similar to what
they would have been under a
requirements contract.53 Accordingly, the
EPA admonishes state regulators to “pay
close attention to ensuring that the design
of partial requirement rate structures
captures the economic and environmental
benefits of reduced energy consumption.”54
Ohio does not have a statewide policy on
standby rates55, and standby fees are in
part subject to private negotiations. The
52

Miller, supra at 17. At the time of this report, The
Midwest Clean Energy Institute had undertaken no
similar study of standby rates in Ohio.
53
Weston, Standby Rates for Customer-Sited
Resources, at 17.
54
Id.
55 However this may change. In the winter of
2013 the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio had
opened a docket for the purpose of taking
comments on regulations controlling standby
rates for CHP. See In the Matter of the
Commission’s Review of Chapter 4901:1-22 Ohio
Administrative Code Regarding Interconnection
Services, Case Record 12-2051-EL-ORD.
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American Electric Power Company provides
standby energy, but the commodity itself is
purchased from another provider. The
standby fee is demand based, and billed
from the contract demand. Cincinnati Gas
& Electric Company (Duke Energy) also has
no specific standby rate, however charges
fees based on peak demand.56 For
Cincinnati Gas & Electric, the demand rate
will be at least 85% of the highest monthly
kilowatt demand as established in the
summer period.57
Ohio Edison's Public Utilities Commission of
Ohio tariff allows charges of up to $3.02 per
kW for secondary voltage “Backup Capacity
Reservation and Daily Backup Power.”
Accordingly, based on this rate, a 25 MW
industrial co-generation or commercial
building CHP project could pay a monthly
demand charge of $75,500, with total
annual standby costs of $906,000.58
The Cleveland Illuminating Company has
both “capacity” and “demand” charges for
supplemental contracts. The “Capacity
Reservation Charge” is broken down into
“transmission and distribution” and
“generation” charges, and is billed on a per
kW basis, depending upon the voltage.
Demand charges are broken down into two
categories: (1) supplemental demand and
(2) back up demand. Supplemental power
is set by the rate schedule. Back up
demand, which covers both back up and
maintenance situations, allows the

customer to choose one of two charge
methods, the latter of which is eligible on
only 15 days per year. On top of these
charges, there is a “maintenance charge,”
plus “energy,” “reactive demand,”
“emergency power” and “customer service”
charges.
The minimum charge for a month under the
supplemental contract is “the sum of the
Capacity Reservation charge multiplied by
the Capacity Reservation, plus the
Customer Charge, plus the minimum
charges of any applicable Rate Schedules.”
So, if no electricity is taken, the minimum
monthly charge for a 25 MW high voltage
system would be the customer charge
($95.59) plus $3.38(25,000) = $84,595.50.59
This totals over $1 mm per year in back up
charges for a system that never even uses
back up power – clearly a number that will
have a chilling effect on any development of
CHP.

56

See Energy & Environmental Analysis (2008);
http://www.eeainc.com/rrdb/DGRegProject/States/Newsite/OHrevis
ed.html.
57
Id.
58
L.Traves, “Another Bad Energy Policy for Ohio,”
Crain’s Cleveland Business, May 29, 2012;
http://www.crainscleveland.com/article/20120529/
BLOGS05/120529844

Center for Economic Development, Cleveland State University

59

Partial Service Schedule, CEI 2012 Electric Service
– 2011 PUCO Tariff at Original Sheet No. 46, PUCO
No. 13 pages 1-9. The CEI Partial Service Schedule
can be found at: See:
https://www.firstenergycorp.com/content/customer
/customer_choice/ohio_/ohio_tariffs.html

Page 19

IV. Strategies for Enabling Manufacturing-Based Distributed
Generation in Ohio
A. Energy Efficiency Credits Under Senate Bills 221 and 315
Ohio Senate Bill 221, passed in 2008,
requires that investor owned utilities in
Ohio undertake energy efficiency
improvements, among other mandates.60
Those requirements are set forth as
benchmarks. The costs of meeting the
mandate are passed along to ratepayers
through a rider, known as the DSE-2. To
date, the DSE-2 rider has been relatively
small. However, as the requirements to
improve efficiency increase over time, and
as the easiest, least expensive work is
completed, the DSE-2 rider is expected to
rise.
Large-scale electricity users, like
manufacturers, can obtain a waiver for
some or all the DSE-2 rider if they
undertake energy efficiency improvements
on their own. Under SB 221 such
manufacturers qualify as “mercantile”
consumers, and as such, are eligible to
follow a protocol leading ultimately to the
Public Utility Commission approving the
waiver.
However SB 221 did not include any sort of
incentive for manufacturers to utilize waste

60

SB 221 requires that investor owned utilities
obtain 12.5% of its energy generation from
renewable sources by 2025. Benchmarks were
included on a year-to-year basis designed to reach
that goal. SB 221 also requires that utilities
undertake efforts to meet a cumulative energy
usage savings, compared against a base load set in
2008, of 22% by 2025. The energy usage savings is
also benchmarked on a year-to-year basis. See Ohio
Revised Code Section 4928.01 et seq.
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heat or combined heat and power systems,
either under the renewable portfolio or
under the energy efficiency portfolio. This
oversight was addressed recently by the
passage of Senate Bill 315. Under SB 315,
Waste Energy Recovery (WEH) systems are
classified as “renewable” generation for
purposes of qualifying for Renewable
Energy Credits (RECS), and, importantly, for
net metering purposes.61 SB 315 will have
a catalyzing effect on the considerable WER
potential market in Ohio, especially for
large scale, energy intensive manufacturing
where current processes generate large
amounts of waste heat.
But SB 315 did not include natural gas-fired
CHP in the renewable category.62
Accordingly, CHP enjoys neither the ability
to generate RECS nor the ability to convert
the value of surplus power to the value of
electricity near the site of consumption. SB
61

Waste heat recovery systems – called Waste
Energy Recovery under SB 315 -- can also be placed
under the energy efficiency category, which may,
under certain circumstances, be of more value than
being classified as a renewable. A waste energy
recovery system is a facility that generates electricity
through the conversion of byproduct heat from an
industrial process. See Ohio Revised Code Section
4928.01 (36).
62
Presumably the reason CHP was not included as a
renewable is because, unlike for WER systems, which
use byproduct heat from existing industrial
processes, gas-fired CHP introduces fossil fuels into
the system. See e.g. T.Odonnell, et al, “Governor
Kasich Signs Far-Reaching Energy Bill Into Law,”
Bricker & Eckler Bulletin, June 14, 2012;
http://www.bricker.com/services/servicedetails.aspx?serviceid=140
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315 did, however, provide that CHP (and
WEH) would qualify as a form of energy
efficiency under the portfolio requirements
as set forth in SB 221. As the costs
associated with meeting the SB 221 energy
efficiency mandates increase over time, this
could prove to be a significant incentive to
develop CHP in distributed settings.
Unfortunately it appears that
manufacturers will have only a limited
ability to take advantage of this incentive.
Normally a manufacturer who implements
energy efficiency measures enjoys the
waiver of the DSE-2 rider on the remaining
load he purchases from the utility. But if
the manufacturer goes off the grid by
adding CHP, or otherwise reduces its load to
a small supplemental contract, then the
DSE-2 rider waiver has little value. The only
way for a manufacturer to obtain value
from the waiver under these circumstances
is if it aggregates its energy efficiency
portfolio with other consumers who
otherwise have no ability to obtain a
waiver, and they in turn pay some value to
the manufacturer for this purpose.
The utility of course can install CHP itself to
meet the standards, and then sell power
therefrom through the grid. Indeed, this
would also enable utilities to not lose the
sale, which of course is the principal reason
why utilities oppose DG – their profits are
tied to their sales volume. However so long
as regulatory law guarantees a rate of
return for the grid but not for generation,
utilities will in general prefer using
increasing centralized generation and grid
capabilities over developing their own
distributed generation.

If manufacturers hope to monetize the
value of CHP under the energy efficiency
portfolio set forth in SB 221, it may have to
engage the public utilities commission in
developing a creative way for these credits
to be passed through to the manufacturers
who develop CHP. If no such strategy can
be found, it may have the effect of
thwarting the intent of the legislature in
passing this particular section of SB 315.
Senate Bill 221 also includes qualifying CHP
facilities as an “advanced energy”
technology, which technologies are also
required to be adopted by the investorowned utilities in a manner similar to how
renewable is to be adopted. However that
Bill did not set benchmarks to accomplish
this. Accordingly it is difficult to ascertain
what, if any, value can be attributed to a
CHP facility that qualifies as advanced
technology under SB 221.
Finally, Investor Owned Utilities can also
incentivize CHP through their rebate
programs designed to encourage energy
efficiency, which could be taken in lieu of
the DSE-2 rider waiver. While the costs of
the DSE-2 remains highly speculative, it
appears that the rebates will not, over time,
be as valuable as a waiver of the DSE-2
rider, at least as most experts have been
projecting the rider costs. But if the waiver
has little value to the manufacturer who is
significantly reducing his utility load
through CHP, this rebate could be of
significant value. Investor Owned Utilities
are, however, likely to resist offering
rebates for CHP facilities that reduce the
consumer to supplemental contracts, since
that would in turn reduce sales.

B. Strategies for Funding Distributed Generation
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1. Financing Options
Manufacturing faces another substantial
impediment when it comes to adopting DG.
Upfront investments in CHP projects are
high, and project returns often do not
correspond to those required by
manufacturers or commercial developers.63
Unlike with universities, hospitals or
cooperative utilities, where DG is likely to
find its earliest opportunities,
manufacturing does not have a long-term
mandate to continue operations. It can be
difficult enough to get a manufacturer to
agree to take on plant maintenance as part
of its business portfolio, but when
discussions are raised about commitments
that will run 10 to 15 years out,
manufacturers become skittish. This is
especially so because natural gas
companies no longer offer fixed price
contracts more than five years out, leaving
the last 10-15 years of plant operation
susceptible to an often volatile natural gas
market.64 This certainly adds to the risk
63

T. Kerr, “Cogeneration and District Energy,” at 20,
International Energy Agency (2009). A commonly
used figure for the required payout for
manufacturers is two years.
64
When natural gas first became available as a fuel,
it was produced as a byproduct of oil production,
and as such was oftentimes flared if no market
existed. This led to a nationwide effort to find
markets for natural gas. Producers and pipeline
companies alike routinely entered into 20-25 year
contracts at fixed rates, with little price adjustment.
By the mid 1970’s, prices had skyrocketed for natural
gas, as did costs for production, and those saddled
with supplying these contracts were in financial
trouble. In the 1980’s, the reverse happened –
prices crashed, and end users who were paying longterm prices on gas contracts experienced the same
sort of financial distress the suppliers did in the
1970s – leading to years of “take or pay” litigation.
The result of all of this turmoil caused by market
fluctuation is that few distribution or transportation
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manufacturers face in converting coal
boilers to gas-fired CHP.
Usually one sees this issue manifest itself as
a “competition for capital” – projects with
long-term payouts simply cannot compete
effectively for capital investment within a
company. One way around this “payout”
problem is for third parties to own and
operate the plant. This also tends to
resolve the problem of manufacturers
having to become plant operation experts.
However it also involves having a company
commit to a long-term power purchase
agreement – an obligation that could
become problematic in the event that
manufacturing is cut back or the plant is
forced to close.
The critical element to manufacturingbased CHP finance, inevitably, is heat
generation. Manufacturers may not be
keen to make long-term investments into
electricity generation (or purchases), but
they have little choice in most instances
when it comes to generating heat. Unless
there is a thermal utility nearby capable of
delivering their steam requirements under a
short-term contract, the manufacturer will
have to undertake some form of a capital
commitment to acquire steam regardless.
Accordingly, the best time for
manufacturers to look at CHP is when they
need to replace or upgrade their heat
generation system. With the onset of the
new Boiler MACT rules, the time may well
be now for many manufacturers.
companies will now enter into long-term contracts
for fixed prices. However with the advent of shale
gas, and the resulting current gas surplus, this may
change. Indeed, in places like Ohio, where gas
production is rich in liquids, gas is produced once
again as a byproduct – a circumstance echoing the
advent of the long-term gas contracts of the 1960’s.
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Manufacturers that face uncertainty in
investment into a CHP system – or that face
a shortage of available capital to invest –
will look for innovative financial strategies
to enable CHP projects. These will include
state and federal programs for subsidized
loans, loan guarantees, and the use of
energy service companies (ESCOs).
There are several programs at the federal
and the state levels to assist financing of
CHP systems. These programs typically fall
under the categories of: loans and loan
guarantees, bonds, tax credits, tax
exemptions, grants, rebates, and other
credits and incentives. At the federal level
programs are offered by the U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE), the
Department of Treasury, the Department of
Agriculture, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. At the state level,
programs are offered by the Ohio
Department of Development - Office of
Energy, Ohio Air Quality Development
Authority, and investor-owned electric
utilities such as Dayton Power and Light &
First Energy Ohio. A significant number of
the programs are geared towards financing
energy efficiency capital expenditures and
renewable energy production. However
the DOE, along with other Departments and
State Agencies, have several incentives
specifically for developing combined heat
and power projects.
The most notable resource at the federal
level is the DOE Loan Guarantee Program.
Manufacturing is one of the three
categories for which the DOE actively
promotes projects. With a project target
size of $25 million and up, this program may
be suitable for financing large
manufacturing CHP projects. At the state
level the Ohio Department of Development
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– Energy Loan Fund is the most suitable for
manufacturers willing to invest in a CHP
system. The Energy Loan Fund provides
financing through federal and state funding
resources to eligible entities for energy
efficiency and renewable energy projects.
The projects funded through this program
must result in energy savings of at least 15
percent. In addition to the Energy Loan
Fund, The Ohio Air Quality Development
Authority (OAQDA) provides assistance for
new air quality improvement projects in
Ohio.
A list of some of the programs available to
support CHP project financing include65:
Federal
 U.S. Department of Energy – Loan
Guarantee Program
 Qualified Energy Conservation
Bonds
State of Ohio
 Ohio Department of Development –
Energy Loan Fund
 Ohio Job Stimulus Plan (Advanced
Energy Program)

65

See e.g.
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?I
ncentive_Code=US06F&re=0&ee=1;
http://development.ohio.gov/Energy/Incentives/Ene
rgyLoanFund.htm;
http://development.ohio.gov/Energy/Incentives/doc
uments/EnergyRLFOverviewGuidelines20120420.pdf
; and
http://www.ohioairquality.org/advanced_energy_pr
ogram/. See also C. Cain and A. Samanta, “New
Energy for Older Cities,” at 19, Northeast Midwest
Institute (Sept. 2012),
http://www.nemw.org/index.php/newsarchive/342-nemwi-releases-report-on-new-energyfor-older-cities
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Investor Owned Utility Rebate
Programs
Ohio Air Quality Development
Authority

Another option for manufacturers for
obtaining financing is to lease, rather than
to purchase, the CHP system. Leasing can
allow for the transfer of tax advantages,
such as credits or accelerated depreciation,
to the party that can most benefit from
them.66 The best strategy for
manufacturers to lease such systems is to
identify readily leasable standard gas-fired
gensets, micro-turbines, and full size gas
turbines as the basis of their programs. By
avoiding custom-designed generators,
manufacturers can expect on the order of
80% of the cost of a CHP installation to be
covered by a lease, since these units can
easily be recovered by the lessor and reused. The susceptibility of the units to
recovery also reduces the risk of stranded
assets, and thereby increasing the
likelihood of getting a shorter-term lease
(or power purchase agreement, for that
matter).
Manufacturers may also expect support
from their gas supplier, who can provide
both an attractive supply contract for CHP,
and possibly some support for the
installation. Ohio’s large gas suppliers such
as NiSource-Columbia and Dominion, are
likely to be highly interested in supporting
incremental CHP use – especially as they
continue to invest heavily in developing
midstream infrastructure for the Utica and
Marcellus Shale natural gas extraction.
66

See: “Procurement Guide: CHP Financing” at 12,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Combined
Heat and Power Partnership;
www.epa.gov/chp/documents/pguide_financing_op
tions.pdf.
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Programs to monetize environmental
revenue streams may also provide
additional funding for DG, including CHP. In
particular, under certain circumstances
Emission Reduction Credits (ERCs)
generated from a CHP facility may be
”banked” under Ohio regulatory law, and
emission reductions of nitrogen oxides,
sulfur dioxide, volatile organic compounds
and fine particulates can be tracked,
accounted for, and ultimately traded.67
2. Tax Incentives
Tax incentives also provide a significant
resource for financing a CHP or other DG
project. Incentives that are in the form of
tax credits have the most value, especially
those that are convertible to cash.
However accelerated depreciation schemes
also can have a significant impact on
financing. The federal government also
includes an “Accelerated Modified
Accelerated Cost-Recovery System” for
depreciating capital investment costs for
clean energy.
Manufacturers may qualify for the Business
Energy Investment Tax Credit, a federal
energy tax credit totaling up to 30% of the
total price for renewable distributed
generation systems and up to 10% for gasfired CHP systems. Qualifying renewable
technologies include geothermal heat
pumps, solar energy systems, wind energy
systems, and fuel cells. These systems

67

See: Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
“Emission Reduction Credit Banking Program”,
http://www.epa.state.oh.us/dapc/ERC/deposit.aspx
See also: United States Environmental Protection
Agency, CHP Partnership, “Monetizing
Environmental Benefits,” (March 2012);
http://www.epa.gov/chp/funding/monetizing.html.

Page 24

must be put into service by December 31,
2016 in order to qualify for the tax credit.68

by OAQDA is exempt from state income
tax.71

Eligible CHP projects include systems of up
to 50 MW that exceed 60% efficiency, and
are subject to certain limitations and
reductions for larger systems. The credit is
equal to 10% of expenditures, with no
maximum limit stated. Biomass CHP
systems may be eligible for the 30% tax
credits.69
An example of a State-based tax incentive is
Ohio’s Qualified Energy Project Tax
Exemption for businesses and industry,
which “provides owners (or lessees) of
renewable, clean coal, advanced nuclear,
and cogeneration energy projects with an
exemption from the public utility tangible
personal property tax.” Applicants with
“clean coal, advanced nuclear, and
cogeneration projects” must apply prior to
December 31, 2013 to potentially qualify
for the tax exemption. “Qualified Energy
Projects” will be tax exempt as long as
certain criteria continue to be met.70
For qualifying projects, OAQDA financing
may also lead to tax benefits. The OAQDA
can provide a 100 percent exemption from
the tangible personal property tax, real
property tax, and a portion of other taxes,
such as the sales and use tax. Furthermore,
interest income on bonds and notes issued
68

See:
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?I
ncentive_Code=US02F&re=1&ee=1 (citing 26 USC §
48). See also: United States Department of Energy,
“Tax Incentives for Energy Efficiency (2011);
http://www.energysavers.gov/financial/70010.html.
69
Id.
70
Ohio Department of Development, “Qualified
Energy Project Tax Exemption,” (2011),
http:/development.ohio.gov/Business/AlternativeEn
ergyExemtption.htm.
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ACEEE’s Energy Efficiency State Ranking (2010);
http://www.aceee.org/energy-efficiencysector/state-policy/ohio/207/all/195. Ohio ranked
th
24 among the 50 states, according to the ACEEE.
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C. Microgrids
One way to capture the full potential of DG
is through a distribution system
architecture called a “microgrid.” Although
some do not distinguish between DG and a
microgrid, a microgrid consists of much
more than a single point of generation.
Like DG, however, a microgrid should have
the ability to isolate itself (islanding) from
the utility’s distribution system during a grid
disturbance. This is accomplished through
power electronic interfaces and a single,
high-speed switch. During a disturbance,
the microgrid can be separated from the
utility’s distribution system, isolating the
microgrid’s load from the disturbance
without harming the integrity of the utility’s
system. Islanding has the potential to
provide a higher level of reliability to end
users than that provided by the macrogrid
system as a whole. Once normal conditions
are returned, the microgrid automatically
resynchronizes and reconnects itself to the
grid.72
The microgrid is capable of using an
assortment of power generation resources,
including renewable generation. However
the most common use considered is in
those areas where heat generation is also
required, since this is where efficiencies can
be maximized. Accordingly, the typical
microgrid uses DG and cogeneration to
provide both electricity and heat to multiple

customers joined together on a local
network. It is interconnected with the local
utility a single point, and operates in
parallel with that system. The most
successful forms of micro-grids will be
“smart,” meaning they will provide their
customers with the ability to manage their
demand, so as to optimize performance and
cost.73 In addition, they will enable the grid
managers to remove common causes of
market failure in centralized generation,
such as an underinvestment in energy
efficiency, by retaining responsibility for not
only generation and fuel choices, but also
for end-use equipment, storage capacity,
and waste stream opportunities.74
Microgrids also offer potential advantages
in power quality and reliability (PQR);
indeed, one analyst calls this the
fundamental distinction between the micro
and macrogrids.75 Utilities place much
effort and value on producing high-quality,
homogeneous power, sufficient to meet the
needs of most end-users. End-users, in
turn, try to build their usage models around
this quality. Notwithstanding this, endusers, especially manufacturers, have
heterogeneous quality requirements, and
the microgrid offers a way to tailor quality
to their needs. Indeed, most PQM
problems originate in the distribution
73

72

A. Neville, “Microgrids promise improved power
quality and reliability,” at 1, Power (June 15, 2008),
http://www.powermag.com/business/Microgridspromise-improved-power-quality-andreliability_134_p3.html. For purposes of this
discussion, non-grid connected microgrids are not
considered, although these may have some
application in more isolated areas.
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D. King, “The Regulatory Environment for
Interconnected Electric Power Micro-Grids: Insights
from State Regulatory Officials,” Carnegie Mellon
Electricity Industry Center Working Paper CEIC-0508, at 3 (May 2008) (www.cmu.edu/electricity).
74
C. Marnay, H. Asano, et al, Policy Making for
Microgrids, IEEE Power & Energy Magazine at 67
(May/June 2008).
75
Neville, “Microgrids promise improved power
quality and reliability” at 2.
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network, and the closer the control over
PQM is to the point of use, the easier it is to
control. Unfortunately, however, under
current economic models, PQR is not
valued,76 which is a significant deterrent to
the adoption of microgrids.
Microgrids maximize the value of both
power and heat provided by co-generation
because the power and heat are used close
to the location where they are generated.
The generator is able to sell the power to a
neighboring customer without having to go
through the local utility. Microgrids also
improve efficiency in distribution of energy
and mitigate environmental consequences
of generation. In addition, they can help
utilities reduce equipment expenditures
and help with asset utilization.77
Unfortunately, in most states, microgrids
are allowed only in limited circumstances
under current regulatory schemes.
Generally, if the microgrid is controlled and
operated by a utility, State regulators will
view it with favor. If, on the other hand, it
is controlled and operated by the customers
or the generator, or by an independent firm
that manages the microgrid, it will be
viewed unfavorably. If the interconnection
to the grid is high voltage, it may or may not
be governed by a different set of rules. But
it does enable the microgrid to participate
in the wholesale electric market. This
would introduce some regulatory
components or rules that may be different,
such as those imposed by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission or the
Regional Transmission Organization.78

76

Id. at 3.
King at 2.
78
Id. at 4.
77
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There is considerable uncertainty about the
applicability of utility tariffs and
interconnection procedures for microgrids.
Utilities, of course, are concerned about
safety issues as well as system stability.
Procedures can and have been designed by
such groups as the IEEE, PJM and FERC to
mitigate problems. Even so, there is
uncertainty in how these standards will be
applied in the various states. 79
In 2011, a significant step forward was
taken by the development of the IEEE
P1547.4 standard, which does much to
mitigate utility safety and other concerns
over grid-connected microgrids. Instead of
viewing microgrids as potentially
disconnecting their loads, now they can be
viewed as a source of demand response.80
However IEEE P1547.4 is, to date, a
voluntary compliance rule in most
jurisdictions.
In Ohio it is uncertain whether microgrids
can be built at the distribution level.81 It is
also unclear whether Ohio’s current
interconnection procedures or
requirements would be applicable to
microgrids.82 Clarity will be required in the
regulatory law governing microgrids before
they can be advanced as a macrogrid79

Id. at 8.
P.Carson, “Grid-tied microgrids: a utility's best
friend?” Intelligent Utility (January 3, 2012),
http://www.intelligentutility.com/article/12/01/gridtied-microgrids-utilitys-best-friend.
81
King at 16. Utilities, however, can undertake
micro-grid development. AEP has, for instance,
taken some first steps towards a micro-grid of sorts:
they have installed community electricity storage
devices (lithium ion batteries) in a few test locations.
See
https://www.aepohio.com/save/demoproject/newt
echnology/CES.aspx.
82
Id.
80
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connected enabler of CHP or other
distributed generation. Because of Ohio’s
regulatory laws governing investor-owned
utilities, cooperative and municipal utilities

are likely to move more quickly than
manufacturers to take advantage of the
microgrid's capabilities to deliver
distributed generation.

D. Decoupling Electricity Sales from Utility Profits
One strategy that may help enable the
adoption of DG is a regulatory device
known as “decoupling.” Utility regulators
have long recognized the fundamental
conflicts that exist in a regulatory system
that seeks to reward utilities for both selling
electricity and for encouraging consumers
to conserve. Under traditional regulation,
utilities make more money when they sell
more electricity. But this is hard to
reconcile with public policy objectives for
using less electricity, or at least using
electricity more efficiently. This dilemma
is known as the “throughput incentive
problem.”83
Complicating this issue further is the
phenomenon known as “Jevon’s Paradox,”
(or sometimes, the “rebound effect”) which
states that the more one improves
efficiencies in use of resource, the more
one encourages new and additional uses of
that resource.84 Many have argued that
state-regulated energy efficiency programs
are doomed to failure due to Jevon’s
83

J. Lazar, F. Weston, et al, “Revenue Regulation and
Decoupling: A Guide to Theory and Application,”
The Regulatory Assistance Project, at iv (June 2011).
84
See e.g. D. Owen, “Annals of Environmentalism:
The Energy Efficiency Dilemma” at 78, The New
Yorker, December 18, 2010. URL:
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/20/
101220fa_fact_owen. William Stanley Jevon was an
English economist. In his 1865 book entitled the
“Coal Question,” he observed that improvements in
efficiency in coal burning technology had led to a
proliferation of new coal burning uses, and a
resulting increase in coal consumption.
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Paradox. A common example given is result
of the federal program to improve energy
efficiency in refrigerators, which, instead of
reducing the electricity consumed from
refrigeration, led to a proliferation of
multiple refrigerator households. The
counter argument to this is that energy
efficiency programs are not necessarily
about reducing electricity consumption, but
about reducing waste. If two refrigerators
in every home improve the quality of life in
those homes (and perhaps also reduces
food waste), then the goals of the energy
efficiency programs have been met. In
short, energy efficiency programs should be
less about reducing energy consumption
and more about reducing waste. In the
end, we know what utilities think about
Jevon’s Paradox; they never voluntarily put
demand side energy efficiency programs in
place. To the extent that Jevon’s Paradox is
a real phenomenon, there would be no
need for decoupling electricity throughput
from profit – energy efficiency, distributed
generation and demand response all should
act to increase throughput and therefore
utility profits under traditional regulatory
schemes.
Jevon’s Paradox is also insufficiently
proven85 to convince policy makers that
programs like energy efficiency, distributed
85

See e.g. Think Progress, “Debunking Jevon’s
Paradox,” February 16, 2011;
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/02/16/20753
2/debunking-jevons-paradox-jim-barrett/?mobile=nc
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generation or demand response are really
encouraged under current utility revenue
models. As a result more and more policy
makers are coming to believe that the
throughput model for measuring utility
profits is not in the best interest of society.
Instead, these policy makers have sought a
model that decouples profits from
throughput and realigns them with what
they believe to be in society’s interests.
Under traditional regulation, a utility’s
recovery of expenses (revenue
requirement) is based upon determining
the net equity investment (i.e. expenses)
and adding thereto an allowed rate of
return, plus taxes.86 The rate case price is
then determined by dividing that number
by the sales in kWhs for the period of time
the expenses were incurred. Expenses are
broken down into production and nonproduction costs. Production costs are
composed of fuel and purchased power
costs, with some operation and
maintenance and third party transmission
expenses included. These expenses will
vary directly with consumption. Nonproduction costs are those that are related
to the delivery of electricity – transmission,
distribution and retail services. This
includes non-production operations and
maintenance, depreciation on equipment
and interest on debt. These normally do

not vary much with consumption, at least
not in the short run.87
There are several ways to approach
decoupling, all of which share a goal of
recovering a defined amount of revenue,
independent of sales volume.88 But the
essential element is the migration of certain
cost items into or out of the production cost
recovery mechanism. Full decoupling
insulates the utility’s revenue collections
from any deviation of actual sales from
expected sales. Any deviation results in an
adjustment of revenue to match a prearranged budget, such as the revenue
recovered in the last rate case.
Under a decoupling scheme, a customer’s
bill is not decoupled from consumption.
Accordingly, the customer retains a
financial incentive to reduce energy
consumption, while the utility retains its
ability to recover costs and revenue.89
Decoupling eliminates a strong disincentive
that utilities have to invest in energy
efficiency. It does not, however, by itself
incentivize distributed generation. It
merely removes the natural hostility
utilities might otherwise have for DG, since
it no longer impacts near term profits.90 As
of 2009, 17 states have implemented
decoupling mechanisms, including 28
87

Id. at 4-6.
Id. at 8. Utah, Oregon, California, Hawaii and
Massachusetts are among some of the states that
employ some aspects of decoupling. Id. For a full
explanation of the different decoupling mechanisms,
see id. at 8-20.
89
National Renewable Energy Laboratory,
“Decoupling Policies: Options for Encouraging
Energy Efficiency,” (Dec. 2009);
www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46606.p
90
Lazar, “Revenue Regulation and Decoupling,” at
12.
88

86

Lazar, “Revenue Regulation and Decoupling”, at 4.
If a utility with $100 mm in expenses is allowed a
10% rate of return, and it pays taxes at a 35% rate,
its total revenue requirement is $115.38 mm ($100
mm + $10 mm + $5.38 mm). To get to the rate case
price, the revenue requirement is then divided by
the total sales in kWhs for the year. So if there is 1
billion kWhs delivered in the year those expenses
are incurred, the $115.38 mm is divided by that
number, leaving a rate price of $0.115/kWh. Id.
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natural gas distribution utilities and 12
electric utilities. Six other states are in the
process of implementing decoupling
mechanisms. California, New York,
Maryland and Wisconsin had decoupled
both electricity and natural gas.91
In Ohio Senate Bill 221 established the
authority for the Ohio Public Utilities
Commission to establish rules for revenue
decoupling mechanisms for electric
distribution utilities, pursuant to Ohio
Revised Code 4926.66(D)). Decoupling can
be included in an electric utility’s “Energy
Security Plan” (see ORC 4928.143(B)(2)(h)).
However to date it does not seem that any
utilities in Ohio have sought to implement a
full decoupling program.

91

NREL, “Decoupling Policies,” supra, at 6.
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E. Self-Generation Investment Programs
California has the best-known incentive
program for self-generation: the SelfGeneration Incentive Program (SGIP). It
provides rebates for customers of utilities
for installing qualifying distributed
generation technologies. The SGIP
“represents a publicly funded rebate
program that is intended to help reduce the
price of DG technologies to the point where
these technologies are competitive in the
market place without incentives.”92 The
program was originally designed as a “peak
load reduction” strategy, as a response to
the energy crisis California incurred in
2001.93 According to an independent study
undertaken by Itron, Inc., the benefits to
society have met or exceeded the costs
incurred for nearly all the DG technologies
approved, with the notable exception of
storage technologies.94
The technology installed should be
designed to meet some or all of the on-site
electricity requirements, with the potential
for exporting some power back to the grid.
Combined heat and power is among those
technologies that qualify, although
renewable technologies may enjoy greater

92

California Public Utilities Commission, “Self
Generation Incentive Program Handbook,” (2007),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/
aboutsgip.htm. A few states, including California,
also provide for price control on natural gas used in
DG projects.
93
See Itron, Inc., “CPUC Self-Generation Incentive
Program: Cost Effectiveness of Distributed
Generation Technologies” (2011), at 3-9,
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/2EB97E1C‐
348C‐4CC4‐A3A5‐
D417B4DDD58F/0/SGIP_CE_Report_Final.pdf
94
Id. at 3-26.
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support, depending upon their ability to
achieve greenhouse gas emission reduction.
The program administrators are the three
investor owned utilities in California, plus
the California Center for Sustainable
Energy. California Senate Bill 412 extended
the SGIP from January 1, 2012 to January 1,
2016. Additionally, Senate Bill 412 revised
the SGIP, making eligibility for the program
based on the potential for greenhouse gas
emission reductions.
The California SGIP is a California Public
Utilities Commission program that
incentivizes “clean, efficient, on-site
distributed generation.”95 The generation
system is installed on the customer side of
the meter.96 Most of the participants are
commercial or industrial, with some limited
participation from residential, government
and other sectors.97
The 2011 SGIP budget was around $77 mm
in total. About 75% of the funding was
allocated for renewable and emerging
technologies, with the other 25%
designated for non‐renewable
technologies.98 Funds for the SGIP are
acquired through fees charged to the
ratepayers for each utility company. As of
December 31, 2010, a total of 441 projects

95

California Public Utilities Commission, “Self
Generation Incentive Program Handbook,” (2011),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/.
96
Id.
97
See Itron, Inc., “CPUC Self-Generation Incentive
Program: Cost Effectiveness of Distributed
Generation Technologies,” supra.
98
Id. at 68.
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had been completed under the SGIP, for a
total capacity of 227 MW.99
California Investor Owned Utilities benefit
from the SGIP insofar as it helps them meet
the California Renewable Portfolio Standard
(33% of the electricity by the year 2020)
and energy efficiency goals. The incentive
program also benefits the SGIP ratepayers
through reduced electricity bills. Overall,
“payments to SGIP participants benefit all
ratepayers by reducing the need for utilities
to invest in expensive transmission and
distribution infrastructure.”100
The incentive levels for eligible DG
technologies range from $1250/kW
installed costs for wind, waste heat to
power and pressure reduction turbines to
$500/kW installed, for gas-fired CHP or
micro-turbines. Emerging technologies,
such as energy storage and biogas enjoy a
$2000/kW installed subsidy, and fuel cells
$2,250/kW.101 Projects greater than 30 kW
are paid half up front, and the other half
over a five-year period, based upon
performance. The maximum incentive
amount is $5 mm per project, never to
exceed 60% of the project cost.102

Excess power produced can be exported to
the grid. However, the amount of energy
exported to the grid is not to exceed 25% of
the energy produced on‐site yearly.103
When power is exported back to the
electrical grid, customers receive net energy
metering credits from only certain
technologies, such as fuel cells and biogas‐
fueled systems. As with Ohio, gas-fired CHP
does not receive the “full retail rate” for
power exported to the grid.104
Ohio has no similar self-generation
incentive program, although there are some
similarities between Senate Bills 221/315
and the California SGIP. Ohio also allows
net metering, for instance, for renewable
generation and for waste heat recovery, but
not for gas-fired combined heat and power.
However subsidies of up to 60% and $5 mm
per project would have a significant effect
in enabling at DG in Ohio. Certainly a
$500/kW installed cost subsidy would be a
major impetus for the adoption of smaller
scale gas-fired combined heat and power
projects.

99

California Public Utilities Commission, “Self‐
Generation Incentive Program Statistics” (December
19, 2011);
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/
SGIPstats_through12‐31‐ 08.htm
100
California Public Utilities Commission, “CPUC
Regulatory Process and the SGIP,” (2007). URL:
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/
pucregprocess.htm
101
California Public Utilities Commission, “Self
Generation Incentive Program Handbook,” (2011),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/DistGen/sgip/.
Solar energy has a separate program from the SGIP.
102
Id. at 25-26. See also
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?I
ncentive_Code=CA23F.
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F. Regional Energy Planning
Manufacturers interested in distributed
generation might benefit from regional
collaboration with local authorities and
communities. Distributed generation,
especially CHP, will not be a “one size fits”
all application; every situation requires an
analysis specific to those circumstances.
Planning can help manufacturers identify
strategies to deploy CHP, including more
access to less expensive “off the shelf “
technologies.
In particular, for regions with a large variety
of manufacturing and other electricity
intensive users, a coordinated regional CHP
program may be useful to new and existing
manufacturers trying to find a fit for their
power and heat needs. Such a program
might be set up to address three strategic
areas:
1. Commercial buildings and small
industrial applications – deploying
similar equipment and with similar
financial goals and capabilities;
2. Institutional facilities – with larger
power and heat requirements, and
with longer-term financing abilities,
these facilities may be more
amenable to ESCO savings and other
finance structures; and
3. Major industrial and district heating
CHP's, where large-scale power is
generated, visibility is high, and the
returns to the districts and
industries involved are potentially
great.

potential projects, but also potential project
developers for on-site DG. Such a master
plan might begin with a Geographical
Information System based “energy map”
that is prepared at a neighborhood, local
authority or sub-regional scale. It might
include an assessment of existing building
energy demands as a baseline, identify
likely locations for new business
development and assess effects on energy
demand. It might also include a “heat
map,” identifying anchor heat loads, such as
large public buildings.105
These energy maps could reveal CHP
generated district heating opportunities
that local authorities or project managers
might be willing to support. They may also
inform growth options and serve as the
starting point for energy planning for
developers. A decentralized energy master
plan could include technical, planning,
financial, and legal support – all better
enabling manufacturers to evaluate DG
opportunities.
Local energy planning can provide a
roadmap for manufacturing to identify
strategies for developing on site DG
opportunities. Traditionally, with
centralized generation, transactional costs
have been a small percentage of the total
project costs, and as such, do not threaten
planning. However transactional costs do
not generally go down proportionally with
the project size. These costs can serve as
an impediment to the development of DG.
Manufacturers are generally unwilling to
105

The development of an energy master plan
could help manufacturers identify not only
Center for Economic Development, Cleveland State University

M. King and R. Shaw, “Community Energy:
Planning, Development and Delivery,” at 7 (Ashford
Colour Press 2011).
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spend hundreds of thousands dollars
identifying potential distributed generation
projects, especially small projects below a
few Megawatts. Regional energy planning
may help reduce these costs for
manufacturers by identifying for them not
only potential projects, but also potential
collaborators and sources of funding.

heating through CHP projects. The King
study included a ten stage undertaking that
included among other things, data
gathering, project identification, financial
modeling, and feasibility studies.109 This
sort of information would be more useful in
developing manufacturing’s appetite for
undertaking DG.

To date only a handful of regional energy
plans have been developed in the United
States. These included studies conducted
in San Diego106, Kane County (Illinois)107 and
New Hampshire.108 All of these studies
included a baseline investigation of energy
production and projected needs for the
region. All included an action plan to
address climate change and to increase
local energy production while decreasing
reliance on fossil fuel generation. All three
also developed strategies for enabling
distributed generation systems to increase
local energy production.
None, however, employed the energy
mapping strategies that were developed for
London, England in the aforementioned
King study. This sort of investigation will be
required to enable manufacturing to
identify opportunities to provide district
106

San Diego Regional Energy Plan by San Diego
Association of Governments in December 1994.
Complete energy plan can be found at:
http://energycenter.org/uploads/energy_plan.pdf.
107
The full energy plan for Kane County is available
at:
http://www.countyofkane.org/Documents/Office%2
0of%20Community%20Reinvestment/Energy%20Effi
ciency%20and%20Conservation%20Block%20Grants
/Kane%20County%202040%20Energy%20Plan/KC20
40EP_5_20_2011_FULL.pdf.
108
Rockingham Planning Commission (2008),
Regional Master Plan: Energy Chapter. Full text
found at: http://www.rpclnh.org/PDFs/projects/energy/Energy%20Chapter%2
06-4-08.pdf
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King, supra, at 14-35.

Page 34

V. Conclusions
Ohio today faces a considerable challenge
in keeping its manufacturing base
competitive. Energy-intensive
manufacturing, in particular, is threatened
by rising electricity costs and a potential
need to reduce carbon emissions.
Electricity costs are scheduled to go up
considerably, especially in northern Ohio, as
a result of increased capacity charges and
the retirement of old coal plants. In
addition to this, Ohio manufacturers are
expected to incur significant capital
investment costs in complying with new
EPA guidelines for heat and steam
generation. Both of these trends indicate a
need for manufacturing to consider
distributed generation, especially combined
heat and power systems, to improve
efficiencies and to reduce costs and
emissions. The good news, however, is
that the timing to do so could not be better:
natural gas – the primary fuel for CHP
systems – is currently inexpensive, and is
likely to remain so for sometime as a result
of the advent of shale development.
According to the companion study
undertaken with this investigation, an
increase in the industrial electricity price by
1 cent per kilowatt-hour decreases average
manufacturing productivity by 2.2% per
employee. Northern Ohio will face PJM
capacity charge increases comparable to
this amount by 2016. Continued price
increases for electricity will likely have a
material affect on Ohio manufacturing’s
ability to compete in a global market. The
development of strategies to keep
distribution and other charges from
skyrocketing in the coming years will be
critical. Among the most promising of these
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strategies is the adoption of Combined Heat
and Power technology.
But investment by manufacturing into CHP
or other DG systems will not be possible
unless there is a regulatory framework in
place that encourages the adoption of these
systems. Current regulatory schemes in
Ohio have taken some steps, such as Senate
Bills 221 and 315, to encourage distributed
generation and CHP. However there remain
significant obstacles to the adoption of CHP,
such as high standby fees, that threaten the
widespread adoption of that technology.
It will require energy-intensive
manufacturing to again take leadership in
rethinking and reinventing our energy
generation and distribution model, just as it
did thirty years ago when it led America to
deregulate its wholesale electricity markets.
America’s next energy “quiet revolution” –
the switch to distributed generation -- will
be just as important to the American
economy as was the deregulation of
wholesale electricity markets. This will be
especially true for Ohio, where the
economy is highly dependent upon energyintensive manufacturing. Ohio’s electricity
generation and distribution models for the
next fifty years may very well depend upon
the leadership shown by manufacturing in
the coming years.
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